













For	a	 long	 time,	 the	Venezuelan	democracy	was	an	exception	 in	South	America	due	 to	a	
party	system	that	was	based	on	what	was	known	as	the	‘Punto	Fijo	Pact’.	At	the	start	of	the	
1980s	a	series	of	economic,	social	and	political	events	began	to	occur,	which	caused	this	
‘exceptionalism’	 to	 stagger	 and	disrupt	 the	 institutionality	 of	 the	 traditional	 Venezuelan	
democratic	State.	The	events	led	to	a	deep	national	crisis	and	the	birth	of	a	new	political	era.	
By	the	end	of	the	1990s,	there	had	been	a	significant	shift	towards	left‐wing	governance.	
Hugo	 Chávez	 Frías	 subsequently	 won	 the	 presidential	 elections	 in	 1998.	 This	 paper	
analyzes	some	aspects	of	the	criminal	policies	that	were	implemented	during	the	reign	of	
left‐wing	leader	Chávez	till	his	death	in	2013	and	thereafter	by	Chavist	party	president	elect,	
Nicolás	 Maduro	 during	 2013‐2014.	 Four	 stages	 can	 be	 identified	 in	 the	 behavior	 of	
incarceration	rates.	The	 first	 stage,	 from	1999	 to	2000,	was	characterized	by	 the	 lowest	

























system	 that	was	based	on	what	was	 known	as	 the	 ‘Punto	Fijo	 Pact’.	 The	 system	 involved	 the	
exchange	of	presidential	power	between	two	parties,	Democratic	Action	and	COPEI	(also	called	
Social	 Christian	 Party	 (Partido	 Socialcristiano)	 or	 Green	 Party	 (Partido	 Verde)),	 and	 the	
distribution	 of	 statewide	 power	 quotas.	 Even	 though	we	 can	 say	 that	 this	 formal	 democracy	
appeared	to	be	different	from	the	other	dictatorships	in	the	Southern	Cone	(the	geographic	region	





caused	 this	 ‘exceptionalism’	 to	 stagger	 and	 disrupt	 the	 institutionality	 of	 the	 traditional	
Venezuelan	 democratic	 State.	 The	 events	 led	 to	 a	 deep	 national	 crisis	 and	 the	 birth	 of	 a	 new	
political	 era.	 By	 the	 end	 of	 the	 1990s,	 there	 had	 been	 a	 significant	 shift	 towards	 left‐wing	
governance.	Hugo	Chávez	Frías	subsequently	won	the	presidential	elections	in	1998	with	56.2	
per	cent	of	the	votes,	leading	a	broad	civic‐military	movement	of	a	progressive	and	nationalist	




















to	 strengthen	 in	 all	 elections	 from	 1998	 onward,	 consolidating	 the	 movement	 as	 the	 most	
important	political	force	in	the	country	(López	2009:	33).	But	after	winning	the	referendum	in	




overcoming	 a	 powerful	 economic	 war;	 and	 curbing	 urban	 violence	 and	 people’s	 feelings	 of	
insecurity.	
	
This	 paper	 analyzes	 some	 aspects	 of	 the	 criminal	 policies	 that	were	 implemented	 during	 the	
Bolivarian	 political	 process	 until	 2014.	 Four	 stages	 can	 be	 identified	 in	 the	 behavior	 of	






































































These	 changes	 occurred	with	 a	 government	 that,	 for	 the	 first	 time	 in	 Venezuelan	 democratic	


























































































reforms	 that	 would	 restrict	 trial	 in	 freedom	 and	 the	 implementation	 of	 alternative	 punitive	
methods.	
	
In	 the	 National	 Assembly,	 the	 Chavist	 movement	 grappled	 with	 recognizing	 the	 social	 and	
economic	inequalities	that	prevailed	in	society	and	the	inadequate	implementation	of	the	OCCP	
as	the	causes	for	the	increase	in	violence	(Asamblea	Nacional	2000:	26‐27).	Although	the	OCCP	





of	 resources.	 From	 the	 minority’s	 point	 of	 view,	 resources	 were	 necessary	 to	 adapt	 the	
institutionalization	of	the	criminal	justice	system	(for	example,	more	tax)	to	the	new	orientation	
of	the	OCCP	(Asamblea	Nacional	2000:	5‐6).	In	the	end	the	arguments	in	favor	of	restricting	the	













The	 position	 held	 by	 Supreme	 Court	 of	 Justice	 (SCJ)	 about	 the	 responsibility	 of	 the	 OCCP	 in	
relation	to	increased	crime	was	even	more	conservative	than	that	of	the	National	Assembly.	For	
Magistrate	 Alejandro	 Angulo	 Fontiveros,	 the	 OCCP’s	 benefits	 were	 spurious,	 and	 the	
implementation	of	the	Code	was	directly	related	to	increased	insecurity.	This	position	in	relation	
to	procedural	benefits	and	the	retributive	function	of	penalties	also	became	evident	in	judicial	
decisions	and	 interpretations	of	 the	 laws	made	by	 the	 SCJ	 in	which	 the	 SCJ	often	 favored	 the	













could	be	attributed	to	the	 implementation	of	 the	OCCP.	Instead	the	Ministry	 linked	the	rise	 to	
structural	factors	such	as	poverty	and	judicial	and	police	corruption.	President	Chávez	similarly	















restriction	 of	 liberty.	 The	 number	 of	 crimes	 that	 could	 result	 in	 preventative	 detention	 was	
expanded,	the	imprisonment	limit	that	could	be	considered	for	trial	in	freedom	was	decreased	
from	five	to	three	years,	and	the	factors	that	could	be	considered	as	a	flight	risk	were	increased	
(Reforma	Código	Orgánico	Procesal	Penal	 2001:	 Article	 253).	 In	 the	 same	 vein,	 the	maximum	
period	of	preventative	detention	was	increased	as	well	as	the	possibility	of	extending	permissible	
coercive	measures	 when	 detainees’	 release	 dates	were	 imminent,	 but	 only	when	 there	were	
considered	 to	 be	 serious	 reasons	 to	 justify	 this	 and	 the	 established	minimum	penalty	 for	 the	
offense	was	not	exceeded	(Reforma	Código	Orgánico	Procesal	Penal	2001:	Article	244).		
	
In	 relation	 to	 forms	 of	 punishment	without	 the	 restriction	 of	 liberty,	 the	 requirements	were	
tightened,	restricting	the	scope	of	these	measures	to	the	non‐repetitive	prison	population	while	
at	 the	 same	 time	 increasing	 the	 enforcement	 of	 effective	 sentencing	 times	 to	 include	 more	
detainees	(Reforma	Código	Orgánico	Procesal	Penal	2001:	Article	501	and	508).	Rosales	(2012)	
points	out	that	the	reform	brought	back	the	increased	policing	of	criminal	justice,	returning	to	the	
police	 apparatus	 the	 dominance	 that	 it	 had	 in	 the	 past,	 which	 occurred	 under	 the	 pretext	 of	
addressing	the	rise	in	crime	and	the	demand	of	citizens	to	control	it.	In	such	a	situation	the	police	
force	administers	punishments	and,	in	doing	so,	selects	the	clientele	of	the	penal	system.		This	











































which	was	 immediately	 reversed	 thanks	 to	grassroots	mobilization	supported	by	 the	military	






















the	 Criminal	 Code	 was	 adopted	 which	 created	 new	 criminal	 offenses	 in	 2005.	 The	 reform	
hardened	prison	sentences	and	 limited	alternative	measures	 to	 liberty	restriction	 for	offenses	
that	were	considered	to	be	serious	crimes,	which	corresponded	largely	with	the	majority	of	crime	





























Conversely,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 held	 a	 conservative	 view	 and	 was	 disposed	 towards	 the	
restriction	of	flexible	punishment	measures.	With	regard	to	the	legal	or	constitutional	nature	of	
the	procedural	benefits,	the	Supreme	Court	was	inclined	to	define	them	as	benefits	with	a	legal	
character	 rather	 than	 fundamental	 rights,	which	meant	 that	 the	 procedural	 benefits	 could	 be	
awarded	with	differential	 treatment	 depending	on	 the	 gravity	of	 the	offense	 (Judgment	 1654	
2005).	 This	 differential	 treatment	was	 justified	 by	 arguing	 in	 favor	 of	 a	 balance	 between	 the	
individual	 rights	 of	 the	 offending	 individual	 and	 collective	 rights	 of	 society	 (Judgment	 3067	
2005).	
	
The	National	Assembly	 for	 its	part,	even	though	it	had	declared	 it	would	adopt	the	comments	
made	 by	 President	 Chávez,	 in	 practice	 welcomed	 the	 position	 of	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 and	
maintained	 the	 text	 of	 the	 amendment	 made	 to	 the	 Penal	 Code.	 The	 amendment	 included	
limitations	to	the	access	to	procedural	benefits	and	alternative	punishment	measures	for	crimes	
that	were	considered	serious	(La	Gaceta	2005).	With	this	amendment	to	the	Criminal	Code	 in	














modify	 the	 scope	 of	 preventative	 detention	 but	 rather	 focused	 on	 the	measures	 that	 allowed	
detainees	 to	 serve	 an	 alternative	 punishment.	 The	 increased	 incarceration	 and	 detained	
individual	rates	substantiate	this	claim.		
	
The	2006	 reform	made	 the	access	 to	 alternative	punishment	measures	more	 flexible,	 such	as	







offenses	 had	 to	 serve	 at	 least	 half	 their	 imposed	 sentence	 to	 gain	 access	 to	 the	 Conditional	
Suspension	of	Execution	of	Sentences;	instead	they	had	to	meet	the	same	requirements	as	any	













and	 injuries.	 The	 most	 common	means	 of	 protest	 were	 hunger	 strikes,	 self‐kidnappings	 and	














reforms	 related	 to	 the	 proposed	 improvements	 in	 the	 socioeconomic	 conditions	 of	 the	
population.		
	











































and	2005,	 to	 settle	 at	 45	per	100.000	 inhabitants.	 The	2004	and	2005	 levels	 stood	at	 37	per	
100,000	inhabitants,	after	experiencing	a	peak	of	44	in	2003.	
	








In	 2008,	 the	 OCCP	 was	 reformed	 once	 again.	 The	 reform	 consisted	 of	 a	 modification	 to	 the	












words,	 was	 torn	 between	 respecting	 human	 rights	 from	 the	 hand	 of	 penal	 guarantees,	 and	
hardline	policies	related	to	severe	criminal	law	(Asamblea	Nacional	2008:	19).	
	

























to	 have	 no	 former	 criminal	 record	 to	 be	 eligible	 for	 conditional	 suspension	 and	 included	 a	
minimum	security	classification	prognosis	(Reforma	Código	Orgánico	Procesal	Penal	2009:	Article	
493).	Due	to	the	modification	introduced	in	the	requirements	of	the	2006	and	2009	reforms,	the	
2001	 reform	 became	more	 flexible	with	 regard	 to	 the	 possibility	 of	 accessing	 these	 benefits.	






respond	 to	 the	 prison	 issue	 (Asamblea	 Nacional	 2009b).	 However,	 the	 incarceration	 rate	







noted	 that	 the	 demographic	 of	 the	 prison	 population	 had	 not	 changed	 from	 traditional	 Latin	








































The	 Chavist	 forces	 reaffirmed	 themselves	 again	 when	 President	 Chávez	 called	 for	 another	
referendum	to	approve	a	constitutional	amendment	in	2009	that	would	allow	for	him	to	be	re‐
elected	for	a	third	term.	He	won	with	54.86	per	cent	of	the	votes.	From	that	moment	onward,	and	
especially	 in	 the	 last	years	of	his	government,	 it	 can	be	noted	–	with	great	concern	–	 that	 the	
significant	advances	in	the	eradication	of	poverty	and	inequality	in	Venezuela	(see	Figure	9)	did	
not	translate	into	a	decrease	in	crime	rates.4	On	the	contrary,	there	was	an	increase	in	violent	





among	 young	 people,	 in	 addition	 to	 selfishness,	 individualism	 and	 consumerism.	 Perhaps	 an	
explanation,	as	pointed	out	by	Antillano	(2012:	713),	is	that	the	governing	party	began	to	justify	
the	 increase	 in	crime	by	appealing	to	other	 factors	(mainly	socio‐cultural),	now	that	 the	great	



























who	were	 capable	 of	 interpreting	 their	 ideals,	 at	 least	 in	 this	 field,	 and	 translating	 them	 into	
legislative	 proposals	 or	 penal	 policies.	 As	 a	 consequence	 the	 procedural	 reforms	 resulted	 in	
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was	 the	creation	of	 the	Ministry	of	Correctional	Services	 in	2011.	Other	measures	 focused	on	
designing	security	plans	with	conventional	control	strategies	that	focused	exclusively	on	reactive	





In	 light	 of	 this	 were	 the	 security	 plans	 that	 were	 issued	 during	 this	 period	 which	 were	
characterized	by	their	situational,	reactive	and	short‐term	nature.	Even	if	they	were	structured	
to	 show	 that	 they	 benefited	 crime	 prevention	 ideas,	 in	 practice	 they	 were	 accompanied	 by	
repressive	measures	and	reactive	police	operations.	As	Garland	(2005:	85)	notes,	as	important	as	






eligible	 for	 this	benefit,	while	at	 the	 same	 time	 it	 excluded	 those	who	had	benefited	 from	 the	
measure	in	the	previous	three	years,	thus	punishing	recidivism.	In	addition,	the	number	of	crimes	
excluded	 from	 conditional	 (probationary)	 suspension	 of	 criminal	 proceedings	was	 increased,	
especially	for	serious	offences	(Reforma	Código	Orgánico	Procesal	Penal	2012:	Article	43).	In	a	
similar	vein,	the	requirement	of	a	maximum	penalty	of	five	years	to	suspend	criminal	action	was	
raised	 to	eight	years	 if	 it	was	a	 low	 frequency	offence	 that	did	not	 seriously	 affect	 the	public	
interest;	and	the	number	of	crimes	that	were	excluded	from	being	able	to	apply	for	the	principle	
of	 prosecutorial	 discretion	 was	 augmented	 (Reforma	 Código	 Orgánico	 Procesal	 Penal	 2012:	
Article	38).	In	relation	to	working	outside	institutions,	open	prison	regime	and	parole,	the	2012	




Generally	 speaking,	 the	 reform	aimed	 to	 reduce	 the	use	of	preventive	detention	and	 increase	


































was	 equivalent	 to	 a	 decrease	 of	 1,599,828	 votes,	 compared	 to	 the	 results	 of	 the	 presidential	
elections	six	months	earlier	when	Chávez	won	with	a	margin	of	10.76	points.	In	response,	the	

























































1‐14	 years	 for	 some	 offenses	were	 established.	 So	 the	 normative	 approach	 trended	 towards	
punitiveness,	but	not	 in	the	sense	of	 increasing	the	penalties	 for	common	crimes.	Rather	they	
adhered	 to	 the	 demands	 of	 particular	 sectors,	 such	 as	 social	 movements	 and	 human	 rights	
organizations,	 and	 those	 seeking	punishments	 in	order	 to	persecute	behavior	 that	 threatened	
economic	stability.	
	
In	 2013	 the	 prison	 population	 stood	 at	 50,365,	 equivalent	 to	 a	 rate	 of	 169	 per	 100,000	






During	 the	 first	 stage	 (1999‐2000)	 governmental	 policies	 were	 concentrated	 around	 social	
inclusion	programs	which	aimed	to	reduce	poverty,	unemployment	and	inequality.	In	the	field	of	
criminal	law,	by	virtue	of	the	new	constitution,	the	penitentiary	system	prioritized	non‐liberty	








reform	 to	 the	OCCP	 than	 the	 reform	 in	2000	was	adopted	 in	2001.	This	 initiative,	which	was	
approved	by	a	National	Assembly	with	a	Chavist	party	majority,	restricted	the	possibilities	of	trial	




















was	police	 reform	characterized	by	 the	 creation	 of	 policing	 standards,	 the	 establishment	of	 a	
governing	body	in	the	field,	the	creation	of	a	university	to	form	State	Security	Organs,	and	the	
issuing	of	an	integral	public	policy	in	terms	of	citizen	security.	But,	on	the	other	hand,	measures	
were	 implemented	 that	 prioritized	 crime	 control	 through	 the	 installation	 of	 checkpoints	 in	
economically	 disadvantaged	urban	 areas.	This	 explains	 the	 increase	 in	 the	 incarceration	 rate,	
noting	a	significant	increase	from	87	per	100,000	inhabitants	in	2008,	to	150	per	100,000	in	2010.	
	
Whereas	 substantial	 improvements	 of	 social	 conditions	 meant	 that	 poverty	 and	 inequality	
continued	to	decline,	the	homicide	rate	continued	to	climb.	Antillano	(2004)	explains	that,	despite	






a	 reaction	 to	 undemocratic	 attempts	 by	 the	 opposition	 to	 destabilize	 and	 delegitimize	 the	

















orientation	 of	 the	 Chavist	 Government	was	 characterized	 by	 a	 sharp	 turn	 to	 the	 political	 left	
which	 deconstructed	 the	 prevailing	 neoliberal	 orientation	 that	 had	 prevailed	 until	 that	 time.	
However,	this	did	not	translate	into	criminal	policy,	which	was	generally	immersed	in	profound	
contradictions.	For	instance,	criminal	policy	at	times	showed	attempts	to	move	towards	a	position	





























reclaimed	 the	use	of	 social	 inclusion	 strategies	 in	order	 to	 improve	 the	conditions	 that	 led	 to	
crime	 by	 pointing	 out	 that	 making	 prisons	 more	 humane	 was	 like	 humanizing	 capitalism.	









to	 take	 action	 against	 insecurity	 and	 crime	 in	 his	 first	 term	by	 increasing	police	 and	military	
operations	and	control	measures	in	high‐crime	areas.	
	
The	 incarceration	rate	 increases	mainly	with	 indicted	 individuals	and,	even	though	crime	and	
violence	continue	to	rise,	policy	makers	generally	do	not	question	the	effectiveness	and	relevance	
of	 the	 indiscriminate	 use	 of	 imprisonment.	 This	 is	 perhaps	 explained	 by	 the	 high	 electoral	
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1	To	correspond	with	authors,	email	martha_lia@yahoo.com.	Neyda	Peña	and	Bárbara	Tineo	participated	as	assistants	
in	this	research.	
2	This	article	was	originally	published	in	Spanish	(available	at	
http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/clacso/gt/20160404115404/Postneoliberalismo_penalidad.pdf)	and	was	translated	
for	this	special	issue.	
3	The	opposition,	which	remained	a	minority	force	during	this	period,	assumed	a	supportive	attitude	of	the	2001	OCCP	
reform	proposed	by	the	Chavist	movement.	
4	The	poverty	rate	in	2011	stood	at	31.6	per	cent,	almost	20	per	cent	lower	than	in	1998,	when	it	was	50.4	per	cent;	
and	the	Gini	index	stood	at	0.39,	a	decrease	of	nearly	a	point	from	the	0.48	reported	in	1998.	
5	The	data	about	the	prison	population	were	provided	by	the	Ministerio	del	Poda	Popular	para	el	Servicio	Penitenciario.	
The	reference	about	year	2014	only	accounts	for	data	until	August.	
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